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LAW AND

and for
The theories
to pro·
like the natural
the physK world.
this is not enough.
alone will 'Ot do.
Consequently, there is a resurgence lately of
who
for
norms and values by which laws can
judged and evalu ..i!ed as weil as
described. Primarily of the Kantian school, thinkers such a;;, DworkL 1,
Rawls, Nozick, and Gewirth, disparate as their solutions may be, ;;;ll seek
to impregnate the law from without, as it were, with ethical theories based
on a state of
consensus, or the underlying principles of a liberal
political system, or on the notion of man as an active agent. In a fun
damental way, many modern moral philosophers have accepted the
"scientific" view that the study of law in itself can provide little if any
knowledge of what law ought to be. For that, we must go outside of law
(and
to develop the normative yardsticks.
It is the
of this short note that this recent turn of philosophical
events has resulted in two complementary artificialities. First, it is ar
tificial to conceive of law in a non-normative "scientific" manner. Se
cond, it is equally
to look entirely outside of the law for stan
its
and badness. The problem lies, I
dards by which to
believe, in
to law a
of science that is manifestly inap
it would follow, would be to utilize
propriate to its
a theory of science more
to the object of study.
natural

II
The vision
many modern scientific theories
is
perspectives on law offered by
shows us
than
modern science may aid us pragmatically, for example, in determining
whether a
legislated highway speed limit will decrease energy con
sumption more than increase the costs of longer travel time. Certainly,
technological
inform legislators and courts of what harms to
avoid and how to
against them.
science techniques can
decision-making, inform us of the effec
the centers of authority in a society,
or tell us what results from a particular
But, I submit, modern science can tell us little
le1·eu11oie:1ccu perspective, we
never
what it is that
civilizations call law. I know
doctrine of the final cause has been buried a hun·
dred times or more. Yet
the teleological view returns, only
and
without a trace of
It takes
slightly
to aid in one more
for I think
no
effort on my
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models su~ceeding one another without mofam. development, or pur
pose. Reality was
static, and what seemed
be movement was
reallJ'. only a succession of slightly different new worlds
recreated by
God m the way we today would see a "motion" picture
there is in
Humean
truth only a series of stills
taken by a cameraman.
theory of causality and the later Regularity Theory were the logical pro
geny of
Because of the Cartesian and Kantian triumph over
the result is
that today science
can never know the nature of any thing,
never discern what any thing is in itself. What science can do is to order
the manifestations of things and to discover methods (technology) of
manipulating those
(for whatever reason) to desired ends .
. What does ':'eat~h's
reveal to us regarding law? For one thing,
1t follows that 1f science can never discover the nature of any thing, it can
never reveal the nature of law. Instead, we can have competing para
dig~s of what law is among various positivists, each with differing
logical strengths and
but all being contrived or structured
models of various phenomena denoted as "legal." We look to differing
views of law as efficient means to socially desirable ends. Quite ap
propriately, we find that
gaps in moral theory that the positivists
leave are attempted to
filled by Kantian moral theorists who also, to
the extent
follow the
leader, admit that the nature of things
in
can never be known.
In contrast, the Aristotelian theory of science holds that the nature of
any thing can be known, and it is determined in particular (quite literally
in particular) by its "end" or final state of actualization toward which it
tends. All things, say
Aristotelians, are in motion (actively or
passively) toward an actualization of their respective potentialities, that
is to say, toward a state of being that would constitute any thing's
"perfection" were it ever to be reached.
I suggest that, in the case of law especially, our experience makes such
a teleological view much more appropriate and susceptible of discover
ing the reality of law-in-itself more than any other scientific theory can
do at the present time. For is it not true that law is constantly in motion?
When we see how law actually
is it not always changing at the
instigation of agents
as lawyers, judges, legislators, as well as many
other "law-making" agents in a society? Further, is it not evident that
these
are never
Do we not speak of the develop
ment of law?
many
may conflict in their effects, but all
changes in the law are
.
Law then is in motion; it is moved purposefully by agents toward an
end. What end?, we may ask. What, in fact, is the defining purpose of
law? To put it
it
I
the accomplishment of a proper
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ordering of social relations among men.
of ordering of relations, distinguishable
mechanisms or ordering, such as custom,
also, law is directed toward a proper
for no movement
(change) in law can be understood apart from a result that is seen
mover as "good." In this short piece I cannot
personality. And what norm would indeed constitute a proper"'"''"'"'""''"
relationships? I leave this to others in the
of all who work in
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the
tests that indeed it is an institution in constant
peculiar end of a proper ordering of
relations among men.

III
No doubt, it will be evident I have thus
pinned
teleological view of law on a rational reflection of our
of the law. Indeed, I am suggesting that, at
in law if not
things, a teleological perspective is only a rational articulation
we humans experience of something in a dynamic state
Through that experience, we can rationally discern
the thing we are looking at.
A very few decades ago, during the heyday of
existential movement flowered in Western
that existentialists found in the world (and frequently put into their own
writings) they possessed an insight that we would do well to note.
existentialist philosophers and dramatists were in revolt
peared to them to be the sterile rationality of
They saw that philosophy was not only irrelevant to
perience of human life but also that in many cases the ""·"'u""'
did not even care that it was irrelevant. Th~se activities which
the depths of human experience
literature,
were outside of rational knowledge.
analyzed rationally
. what the structure was
Symphony," or how
influenced
say, Buddha - but the intellectuals could not
periencing the "Fifth Symphony," or in
upon the example of Buddha. And even the
the reality of being human was in human
"meaningful" (i.e., rational) theme to
But what
told us was that an
not of the reality of things as
by definition,
us a full human
of
looked at. Accordingly, to understand law, we must
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tionally, but our rational
must not be confined to law's
appearances, but to law through and through, to law as we experience it.
We
up the experiential component of rationality (common sense,
if you will) only at the expense of
up part of our humanity. A ra
tional reflection of
knowing things as they are. No
one, not even Descartes I
his life in microseconds
of successive static states of being. No static Cartesian model of law can
meet, or even
to meet, the reality of the thing as humans ex
perience it. To
law as a command backed by a sanction or that
its ultimate articulation is by judges can tell us some things that may be
observational data of law, but they do not tell us what law is. Such
definitions
us nothing by which we can make rational sense of the
experience
law.
Now, every .... ,,,.N,....
of law is of rules, fixed and deter
minate in their
at any moment in time, but the whole of which is
in a state of change. The attempt to portray
law "scientifically" as
did, to
a "pure" formula of describing
it, simply runs counter to the
of all those who work with it,
whether they be
lawyers,
or citizens. When we ask
ourselves why law is always in a state of change, the evident answer is,
once
that it is moved in order to accomplish its end, to actualize its
potentiality if you will, of the proper
of
relations among
men, not only individually but in other
constituents such as the
family, clan, guild, church, and state. In sum, without a sense of law's
purpose, we can
no
of the very nature of the legal
enterprise.

of justification. A modern scientific approach to law can rio•~rr•ho
phenomenon, but not justify it. It can tell us some of
law, at least as they appear to
but in no way do we know
law is, that is, what is its nature, why it is
what is it about.
the attempt to leaven legal science with
itself lacks. But by using the telos as an
type," we cannot
deseribe the legal enterprise, we can make justifiable
how "well" it is doing. Since law seeks a
among men (which we customarily call
whether indeed a law is just or not.
The fact of the matter is that all know that the law
know that the changes are not undirected to any
Roman candles set off in any direction. We can evaluate a
structure as a better or worse ordering, an
its purpose. The law may be inefficient, it
disorder. It may, in other words, fail to create
On
it may create order but for such an infamous end that we can
call such law "perverted," creating an order
to its true purpose.
In a word, it may be just or unjust.
Similarly, we can apply the same
not
to the worth of individual laws. We can gauge the "'"r1'n"''"'
of laws not only by whether they
whether they actualize the proper order
And this brings us face to face with a
describe a legal system but in the same terms
standard derived from the nature of law
not an external morality which
to the whole enterprise. First of all,
dard in a literal sense because it describes
plicit in the nature of law without which law could not
would then have a different nature
dition, and somewhat redundantly, natural
evaluative standard. We need not seek an
value-free science of law. The standard is a
very nature. To speak about what the proper .wr•"~'""
merely to ask what should be the norm consistent
That is all that is meant by natural law and that is all
mean. Indeed, to find out what
"right" in
discipline.
ethical philosophy as if it were a
logically to natural law which
interstitially
from bad, or even, in
law's
nature,
all.
This of course brings us to the content of

IV
Within my limits
l can only
some of the most essential and
salutary implications of a
view of law.
To begin, by
an end to law which informs us of the nature
of law, we in no-wise
to find that law ever empirically reaches that
end.
man, law may
toward the
of its innate
fulfilling them. Nor is this a cause
potentialities without ever
for
On
where a mechanical positivist view of law
bright
so tc
or exclude certain social rules as
either law or not-law, a
of law permits judgments
to be made on a
moved toward its
make

0
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of the teleological view which I once
somewhat artlessly
.,,.,~a.l.:>c of the:1 scope
paper. Nonetheless, we can still fruitfully
~--,·~~··'M whether natural
the observance of procedural norms
only, as Lon Fuller
to
or whether there are also neces
sary substantive aspects to the
of law's purpose.
It will be
that Fuller discerned a number of "desiderata" to
what he
morality" of law. They included principles of
generality,
limited retroactivity, clarity, limited con
tradictions,
of
relative constancy, and consis
tent enforcement.
procedural norms were necessary for law to be
law. Although
norms were unenforceable, were they absent then a
proposed "rule" would not be law because the nature of the law as defined
by its end would have been fatally undermined. These are constitutive
rules, intrinsically
to the legal enterprise. That is why Fuller
calls them "lower laws"
than "higher laws."
Fuller
that his eight
are not rigid norms each of
which must
fulfilled. Rather, they may in some cases be ad
justed so that the
purpose of the law is fulfilled. Consequently,
security may
require a secret law whose ill effects are later
cured by a retroactive law. This highlights one of the salient features of
natural law, one that is
to many positivists, namely, that
natural law's norms are
only in relation to the telos. The ac
tual practice of a natural law jurisprudence is strikingly dependent on the
virtue of
By championing a
view over those who assumed that law
was
of inert matter," Fuller
that the mere concentra
tion on
structure neglected "the purposive activity this structure is
assumed to
" But
purposive activity require certain
substantive
as well as calling for a number of procedural
means? ls
law substantive too?
Fuller
to draw a line between the procedural and substantive
of natural law, but despite his
the criticisms of H. L.A.
Hart edged him across that line. Where Hart said that there was no
logical connection
values and subsequent "good"
laws, Fuller replied
the inner morality
law will tend toward pro
ducing external
it is dependent on a view of "man's
dignity as a
" Responsible to what? we might ask.
Responsible to
his nature as a human person, we might answer.
And there we have it
law's potentialities is therefore
on what will
man's potentialities. The "good" of law
cannot be
of man. And thus we are drawn in
evitably
in a teleological frame
work.
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primary
of law's
the purpose of law. Law's
A true teleological view
that the legal regime of Nazi
U.S.S.R. is a perversion of the law, for it
cedurally and substantively. I
for now
Cicero, Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, Duguit,
Grisez, Finnis, Veatch, and others over what
per end of man. But if we can find that the
tion, or apartheid is contrary to that
we may
those positive rules are either not law (in
lawful) or that they are, in the true sense of
clusions have been reached by thinkers of
Modern science has developed the notion of
the apparent sequential patterns of the most
physical world. But it cannot tell us what we ought to do
production, or human sexuality, or
teleological science can no more tell us that
than it can tell us what is the natural purpose of
Natural law, however, can tell us what
to be done in
nature of law. If indeed the nature of law is
accomplishment (actualization)
the proper
and effective structure) of relations
(human persons in their various states
justifiable evaluative
We can
just or unjust, wise or stupid What
is equipped to do.
Dr. David r. Fort<' is a professor of law at
He holds his A
from Harvard,
M.A from the
Ph.D. from the University 11f Toronto. and his J.D. from

